Reference
Security
Classes can come from content you do not control. JX treats them as untrusted input.
The risk
An arbitrary value is the only part of a class copied into the CSS. Without checks, c:[red;}body{display:none]
would close its rule and open another one.
These classes produce no rule and trigger a warning:
c:[red;}body{display:none]
bg:[url(javascript:alert(1))]
c:[</style><script>alert(1)</script>]
c:[expression(alert(1))]
What is rejected
| Risk | Rejected in an arbitrary value |
|---|---|
| Escaping the declaration |
; { } ! \ /* */
|
| Escaping a style tag | < |
| Loading code |
javascript: vbscript: expression() @import
|
| Data URLs | data: except images and fonts |
| Malformed value | Unclosed parentheses or quotes |
Note
The check runs twice: in the parser, then in the rules when the CSS is generated. A token built by hand does not bypass it.
Size limits
- A class: 512 characters.
- An arbitrary value: 512 characters.
- Stacked variants: 8, without repetition.
Parsing and extraction run in linear time, whatever the input.
Runtime compilation
If you compile user-typed classes in the browser, the engine applies the same checks. JxParser.analyzeAll
isolates the security-related rejections:
final report = const JxParser().analyzeAll(input);
if (report.securityFailures.isNotEmpty) {
// Reject or flag the input.
}
Note
The content of jx.yaml
(theme, breakpoints) is not validated: it is written by the project's developer and considered trusted.
Reporting a vulnerability
Do not open a public issue. The process is described in SECURITY.md, at the root of the repository.